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Abstract
Many high-tech products and durable goods exhibit exactly one significant price
cut some time after their launch. We call this sudden transition from high to low
prices the price landing. In this paper we present a new model that describes two
important features of price landings: their timing and their speed.
Prior literature suggests that prices might be driven by sales, product line pric-
ing, competitor’s sales or simply by time. We propose a model using mixture
components that identifies which of these explanations is the most likely trigger
of price landings. We define triggers as thresholds after which prices are signifi-
cantly cut. In addition, price landings might differ across products and therefore
we model their heterogeneity with a hierarchical structure that depends mainly on
firm, product type and seasonal effects.
We estimate our model parameters applying Bayesian methodology and we use
a rich dataset containing the sales and prices of 1195 newly released video-games
(VG’s). In contrast with previous literature, we find that competition and time
itself are the main triggers of price landings while past sales and product line are
less likely triggers. Moreover, we find substantial heterogeneity in the timing and
speed of price landing across firms and product types.
KEYWORDS: PRICING, PRICING MODELS, NEW PRODUCTS
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1 Introduction
“Don’t get us wrong – price cuts are a good thing”
Wired.com (2007)
It is well known that prices of new products exhibit one or several important price
cuts during their life-cycle. Nowadays, we are witnessing how many new high-technology
products are introduced at an initial high price and after a certain moment their prices
are cut to a permanent and much lower level. This practice is commonly followed by
manufacturers of products like video-games, apparel, PCs, movies, and so on. Moreover,
scholars have recognized and studied this type of pricing strategy. For example, studies
like Feng and Gallego (1995) and Gupta et al. (2006) point that managers at apparel
retailers in New York City report the timing and depth of price cuts are important
decision variables and the depth of the price cut in this industry is typically between 25
and 50%. In this article, we will call this sudden transition from an initially high price
to a lower price level the price landing.
We are not aware of any empirical study of price landings. This is quite a surprise
because the timing of a permanent price cut for a new product is without a doubt an
important managerial decision. During the first half of 2007 thousands of American
customers purchased Apple’s iPhone and they witnessed a $200 price drop just 66 days
after its release. Consumers were outraged by the sudden price drop and Apple apologized
and issued a $100 store credit to everyone who purchased the iPhone before April 2007.
More recently, the forthcoming market launch of Apple’s iPad has brought attention to
the pricing strategy that the Apple Store will apply to e-books. According to journalists,
Apple is pushing the industry to apply “variable pricing which apparently is triggered by
sales volume and not just pricing whim”, see Wired Magazine (2010). In some instances
Apple’s timing of price cuts have been judged too early if they happened short time
before the Christmas season and in other instances the price cuts have been judged as
occurring too late to stimulate further sales or to fight competition. See BusinessWeek
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Online (2007) and BusinessWeek Online (2008) for more details on Apple’s story.
In this article we present a new model for price landings and the estimation approach
we present is particularly useful to describe the moment and speed at which the price
landing occurs and to simultaneously find the triggers of these sudden price transitions.
Our work offers a complement to studies like those of Tellis et al. (2003) and Golder and
Tellis (1997) because we characterize and describe pricing patters of new products while
these latter authors have studied and characterized new products’ sales patterns. On
the other hand, our modeling approach goes further than a description of price patterns
because it allows us to find what are the most likely triggers of price landings. We apply
our model to the market of video-games and to a rich data set that concerns 1195 newly
released video-games.
The plan of the article is as follows. In Section 2 we present our literature review.
In Section 3 we present our data and market context. Next in Section 4 we present our
modeling approach and in Section 5 we present our results. We present our conclusions
in Section 6. All figures and tables are presented in Section 7. We present the estimation
approach in Appendix A.
2 Literature Review
In this section we review the studies concerned with the video-game industry in subsection
2.1 and next in subsection 2.2 we review the literature related to new products pricing.
2.1 Research on Video-Games
Three empirical studies closely related to our work are Clements and Ohashi (2005), Nair
(2007) and Chintagunta et al. (2009).
Clements and Ohashi (2005) study the indirect network effects between video-game
consoles and video-games and the effects of consoles’ prices on their own sales. Their
findings suggest that price elasticity is low at the beginning and high at the end of the life
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cycle of video-game consoles. Chintagunta et al. (2009) investigate the effects of software
availability and prices on the sales of video-game consoles. They propose an econometric
approach that accounts for the endogeneity of price and sales and they find time varying
price elasticities. In contrast with Clements and Ohashi (2005), Chintagunta et al. (2009)
find some evidence of both declining and increasing elasticities. Other studies, like Parker
(1992) and Simon (1979), report that elasticities may show diverse time profiles across
products, like U or inverted U shapes. See Parker (1992, Table 4, page 365).
Nair (2007) studies the video-game software market and he proposes a model that
takes into account the interaction between publishers of video-games and two consumer
segments formed by high and low valuation gamers. His findings suggest that the optimal
pricing by publishers should exhibit declining prices. The price cut rate (that is the slope
of the price function) in Nair (2007) depends on the relative size of each of the consumer
segments while the overall and initial level of the optimal price depends on the utility
discounting factor and the interaction of consumers and firms.
Our study differs markedly from Clements and Ohashi (2005), Nair (2007) and Chin-
tagunta et al. (2009) because our objective is to introduce a model that is flexible enough
to capture many different and detailed theoretical features of prices that have been doc-
umented in the literature or observed empirically. In this respect, our price model is a
generalization based on previous research. In addition, we offer the first empirical study
that focuses on price landings and their triggers, timing and speed.
Finally, the methods of Clements and Ohashi (2005), Chintagunta et al. (2009) and
Nair (2007) are considered structural while our model may be classified as a reduced form
model. A main advantage of our reduced form is that we do not need assumptions regard-
ing supply and demand side interactions or consumer behavior. A disadvantage of our ap-
proach is that we can not draw inferences regarding consumer behavior or consumer-firm
interactions and that we need assumptions on the form of the price equation. However,
the assumptions we will use for the price equation are more flexible than the assump-
tions of Nair (2007) and Chintagunta et al. (2009). Nair assumes that consumers form
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expectations based on an auto-regressive process of order one while Chintagunta and col-
leagues assume that prices are stationary. In contrast, we present a very flexible equation
that can capture sudden breaks (non-stationarity) and it allows us investigate what is
triggering these breaks. Hence, we offer novel findings and we are the first to measure
quantitatively empirical features of prices that have not been documented before in the
literature. In addition, our econometric approach is computationally simple. Therefore,
we can use our method to study relatively large databases of prices. This may be a
technical advantage over structural models that are usually much more computationally
demanding.
2.2 Research on New Products Pricing
The literature dealing with pricing strategy is extensive and in this section we focus our
attention to a set of empirical and analytical studies concerned mainly with new product
prices. We present the studies we surveyed in Table 1.
In Table 1, we see that 24 out of 32 studies are analytical while 8 are empirical. Out of
these eight empirical studies only Clements and Ohashi (2005), Chintagunta et al. (2009)
and Nair (2007) were published recently and only the study of Nair (2007) is focused
on pricing policies for new products. To our knowledge, Nair (2007) and our work are
the only empirical studies concerned with price patterns. A likely reason of such lack of
empirical studies on prices is the scarcity of detailed price data.
We draw the following generalizations the literature in Table 1: 1. Prices show gradual
or sudden transition from high to low states. Both empirical and theoretical studies have
documented such transitions. 2. Prices show transitions that rarely mimic the S-shape of
sales or that increase over time (8 studies). 3. Prices respond to competition, changes in
consumer valuations across time, consumer heterogeneity, new product releases, learning
curves on costs and market saturation.
The first generalization tell us that prices of new products rarely stay constant. We
note that some studies, like Schmalen (1982), Ferguson and Koenigsberg (2007) and
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Eliashberg and Jeuland (1986), have shown when it is optimal to keep prices of new
products constant. On the other hand, we could hardly draw a consensus about how
fast price transitions should be or how they look empirically. Some studies explicitly
report the optimal price decrease rate, like in Dockner and Gaunersdorfer (1996), Raman
and Chatterjee (1995) and Bayus (1994) while many other studies give less attention
specifically to the speed of price transitions. Much more is known about the shape of
price transitions. Many studies, like Robinson and Lakhani (1975), Kalish (1983), Dolan
and Jeuland (1981), Bayus (1992), show that the optimal policy is for prices to decline
over time. Other studies show the optimal mark-down (or optimal sudden price discount)
based on the length of the season, the perishability of the product or drastic seasonal
changes in consumer valuations or demand. See for example Ferguson and Koenigsberg
(2007), Gupta et al. (2006), Rajan et al. (1992) and Feng and Gallego (1995). Finally,
diffusion studies, like Rao and Bass (1985), confirm that the declining pattern is an
empirical regularity and recent studies, following Bass et al. (1994), usually incorporate
the declining price effect on diffusion.
The literature suggests the generalization that prices should change (in most cases
drop) once an event modifies the market and that these price drops occur in synchrony
with the movements of price drivers. These events are usually related to the drivers listed
in the last column of Table 1. In general terms, previous empirical literature suggests
that x drives y when x is an important underlying variable causing the variance in y. In
contrast, many analytical studies integrate trigger variables into their models where x is
defined as a trigger of y if it has an effect on y only after a certain threshold, for example
after x > xo becomes true where x > xo might mean, for example, competitive entry, the
end of a season or the limit of market potential. For example, Feng and Gallego (1995)
and Gupta et al. (2006) incorporate thresholds after which prices should be marked down.
We believe there is a disconnect between analytical studies that allow non-linearities and
sudden price breaks and empirical studies that assume in most cases linear price functions
without structural breaks.
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The objective of this article is to fill the literature gaps between empirical and ana-
lytical studies of new products’ prices. First, our model, together with the econometric
approach we use, will allow us describe the theoretical features of prices based on a large
database of prices. We focus specifically on the speed and timing of sudden price tran-
sitions, what we call price landings. Second, we test the relative importance of different
price triggers suggested by theoretical and empirical studies simultaneously. We test
whether saturation, market entry, time (a products’ age) or the release schedule of firms
trigger the price landing for each of the 1195 products in our data set. In this way, we
put to an empirical test the theoretical properties of prices discussed in analytical studies
and we connect both streams of research.
3 Video-Game Prices
In this section we first describe our data and next we present a brief description of the
video-game market.
3.1 Data
The database we analyze consists of monthly time series of unit sales and prices for 1195
PlayStation2 (PS2) video games released between September 1995 and February 2002 in
the US. This data was collected by NPD Group from retailers that account for 65% of
the US market. We used the first two years of data for each video-game and left out VG’s
with less than 12 monthly observations. This time frame is justified by the fact that most
VG’s stay on store shelves for less than two years and their sales drop very rapidly to zero
afterwards. Binken and Stremersch (2009) use the same data and they assume that a
video-game is in a so-called dead regime after its sales drop below 5000 units. Therefore,
Binken and Stremersch (2009) do not use any observation after this cut-off point which
leaves out 32 % of their observations. In our case the 24 month cut-off point leaves out
38 % of the observations. We compared our results against a 30 and a 36 month cut-off
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point that leave out 28 and 20 % of the observations, respectively, and our results are
qualitatively the same. Our final sample consists of 1075 video-games.
In Figure 1 we show the price landing of 50 randomly selected video-games. This figure
clearly shows the great diversity of price patterns but it is easy to see of the common
feature across games: their price drops at a certain moment in time. The introductory
prices range from 40 to approximately 60 USD while their landing level is between 15 and
30 USD. Similarly, there is great diversity in the timing of price landings. It is easy to
notice that some VG’s prices drop right after the second month while others land around
the 10th, 12th or 15th month or even later. Finally we notice that some prices drop very
fast, see the lines almost parallel to the vertical axis, while in many other cases they land
at slower rates and with more noise around them.
In Figure 2 we show the price landing of one of the most popular VG’s, the Spider-
Man game. We plot the price of the Spider-Man game on the vertical axis but in each
of the panels we use a different scale on the horizontal axis. In the upper-left panel we
use time on the horizontal axis, in the upper right panel we use the cumulative sales of
Spider-Man and in the lower panel we use the cumulative number of VG’s launched to
the market after the introduction of Spider-Man. We choose these axes because later we
will identify each of these variables as a potential trigger of price landings. More details
on this are given in Section 4.3. These graphs of course show very similar price patterns.
That is, we could say that the price cut of the Spider-Man occurred approximately at the
10th month after its introduction (upper-left panel); or just after reaching 600 thousand
unit sales (upper-right panel); or after 250 VG’s were launched (lower panel). The price
landings in these figures are similar but the interpretation of the different thresholds is
very different. In all cases, these thresholds represent an event after which prices drop,
that is the timing of price landings. Finally, if we look closely at the different price
landing patterns we discover that the speed of landing varies across these panels. Prices
seem to drop much faster when we use cumulative sales than when we use time on the
horizontal axis.
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In the analysis that follows we show how we select one of these potential price landing
triggers for each of the products in our sample. Specifically, in Section 4.3 we present
how we use our mixture specification and the underlying distributions of price landings
to select among potentially correlated price landing triggers. Developing a joint model
for prices, sales and competitive entry is beyond the scope of this article and we consider
it as an area for future research. We explain more details on our modeling approach in
Section 4 and in this section we continue with a presentation of the market context of
our application.
3.2 The Video-Game Market
The video-game market is highly competitive and there are 78 video-game publishers
who design games for PS2. On average, they released 29 new video-games per month
between 1992 and 2005. The main publisher of these VG’s is Sony and it has a market
share of 16%. Acclaim and Electronic Arts follow Sony with market shares of 11% and
6%, respectively. In the upper left panel of Figure 3 we present the distribution of the
market shares across all publishers. We notice that 20 publishers have about 80% of the
market while the 58 remaining publishers cover the next 20% of the market. In the upper
right panel of Figure 3 we depict the monthly time series of the number of newly released
video-games. There is an upward trend in the number of VG’s being released. In 1996
less than 11 VG’s were released per month while in 2002 this volume has increased to 40
monthly releases.
The bottom left panel of Figure 3 shows the industry’s sales pattern. Total VG’s sales
are extremely seasonal and they peak every December when they may reach numbers like
14 million copies. This last number is especially high if we compare it against the 24.1
million units of PS2 consoles sold between 1995 and 2002. Finally, in the lower right panel
we show the average number of video-games released from 1995 to 2002 and the average
sales per month. An interesting fact is that most new VG’s are released during November
and January but sales peak in between these two months. From 1995 to 2002, December
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VG’s unit sales are on average 14 million and in January sales decrease to less than 3
million copies while on average 18 new VG’s are released on December, 27 in November
and 34 in January. In Figure 4 we can see the distribution of the type of video-games
sold. For example, sports games account for 21.5 %, Action 14 % while Strategy games
account for 4 % of all VG’s in our data.
The consumers in this market concern 40 million US-based consumers who buy video-
games each year. Figure 5 shows a histogram of the total sales across all VG’s. Preferences
clearly differ across VG’s as we observe substantial heterogeneity in the market potential
across the video-games. We follow the tradition of diffusion research by labeling the
cumulative sales reached by a video-game as the market potential. From Figure 5 we can
learn that sales above one million units for a single game seem to occur only rarely. The
average market potential for the video-games in our sample is around 254.75 thousand
units. However, approximately for half of the VG’s in our sample (to be precise: for 504
video games) the market potential is less than 66 thousand units.
4 Price Landing: Modeling
In this section we present our modeling approach. The model and econometric approach
we present allow us measure quantitatively the theoretical features of prices discussed
in our literature review. Specifically, the equation we propose allows us describe the
speed and timing of price transitions while we use mixture modeling to test the relative
importance of different price landing triggers. Finally, we apply a hierarchical structure
to describe the empirical distributions of the timing and speed of price transitions and
at the same time to identify the most likely price triggers.
Our model consists of two parts. First we present an equation to describe the price
landing, that is the underlying price of product i at time t, which we call P ∗i (t). Next we
specify an equation that relates the pricing landing to the actually observed prices, what
we call Pi(t). As we observe in Figure 1, prices follow a general inverse S-shape but they
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do not follow it very smoothly and in most cases the prices we observe are noisy. Hence,
in the first equation we capture the price landing and its main two features (timing and
speed) and in the second we capture deviations from it. In Section 4.1 we present these
two equations. Each video-game is allowed to have its own price landing speed, timing,
initial price and landing price parameters. In Section 4.2 we therefore specify how we
model this heterogeneity. In Section 4.3 we briefly discuss the mixture specification that
allows us to identify the trigger of the price landing for each video-game. In Section
4.4 we discuss heterogeneity in mixture probabilities. In Section 4.5 we present details
regarding the co-variates in the hierarchical structure of the model.
4.1 Price Landing Model
The price landing of game i is P ∗i (t) and we assume it depends on a trigger denoted by
Di(t). That is, prices change according to
dP ∗i (t)
dDi(t)
=
(P ∗i (t)− κi)(ρi − P
∗
i (t))
(κi − ρi)νi
, (1)
where ρi is the starting price level, κi is the final pricing level, and νi a constant that
moderates the rate of change dP ∗i (t)/dDi(t). For ease of interpretation, Di(t) might be
for example time and then dP ∗i (t)/dDi(t) = dP
∗
i (t)/dt. Di(t) can be set to be any trigger
variable that we are interested in, like sales or competition. From (1) we see that a
smaller νi implies a faster rate of change. Here, the time index t will in each case be
relative to the launch date of the particular product. In other words for each product
t = 0 corresponds to the time of launch. In the numerator of (1) we have that the closer
P ∗i (t) is to its initial or final levels, the slower prices would change and that if P
∗
i (t) < ρi,
νi > 0, P
∗
i (t) > κi, ρi > κi for all t then dP
∗
i (t)/dDi(t) < 0. These last conditions
describe very closely the price patterns that are common among high-tech products.
Equation (1) may be unusual in the sense that it models dP/dD instead of dD/dP .
However, in our application we will use different trigger variables for D and hence dD/dP
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would not have the common interpretation we find in the literature when D are sales;
for example, D could be competitive introductions. The former is the typical solution
proposed by analytical studies while the latter is the typical form assumed in empirical
studies. One of the possible reasons why empirical studies have assumed this latter form
is that many of them focus on a single firm, usually a monopolist that sets prices. In
contrast, in our study we observe the
dP ∗
i
(t)
dDi(t)
for hundredths of products launched by 78
firms that are price setters. Hence, our objective is to characterize the heterogeneity of
dP ∗
i
(t)
dDi(t)
across products and to capture two of its features, the timing (λi) and speed (νi)
of significant price cuts. In addition, the advantage of equation (1) is that we can solve
it analytically and test it empirically. In fact, it can be shown that (1) is a separable
differential equation and that its solution is
P ∗i (t) = κi + (ρi − κi)hi(t), (2)
with
hi(t) = 1−
e
“
Di(t)−λi
νi
”
1 + e
“
Di(t)−λi
νi
” . (3)
That is, we propose that the price of product i is composed of two parts, a fixed landing
price (κi) plus a mark-up (ρi − κi) that evolves over time proportionally to hi(t). The
function hi(t) gives the percentage of the markup at time t and it is bounded between
0 and 1. The function (3) for hi(t) follows a logistic shape and λi can be interpreted as
the location of the price landing for product i in terms of the trigger Di(t) while νi is the
speed at which the landing occurs. That is, we observe a price drop after Di(t) reaches
its threshold λi and this is why we call Di(t) the trigger variable.
The advantage of a logistic function for the pricing equation is that we can interpret
its parameters in a natural way in our application. We plot equation (1) for Di(t) = t
and different values of λi and νi in Figure 6. As can be noticed from the graph, the
effect of an increase (decrease) of λi is to shift the complete function to the right (left)
and νi has the role of smoothing the function or steepening the function. That is, νi is a
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parameter that determines how fast prices are falling and λi captures the moment (event)
when prices are dropping.
In principle, Di(t) can be any variable that increases monotonously. The simplest
choice forDi(t) is simply time (Di(t) = t). It is important to notice that the interpretation
of λi and νi depend on the choice of Di(t). If we set Di(t) to be the cumulative sales of
product i then λi is simply the number of items sold at high prices. We might interpret
this limit as a proxy for the size of the segment that buys at high prices; what some
call the hard-core gamer segment. This is a natural interpretation for λi but we do
not claim that this model really identifies who and how many are the real hard-core
gamers. Furthermore, if we define Di(t) as the number of products introduced after
launch of product i then λi becomes a competitive threshold after which prices are cut.
In all cases νi is a scaling constant that marks the transition speed of prices as we set in
equation (1) and it of course depends on the scale of Di(t). Notice that Di(t) might be a
combination of different trigger variables. The interpretation of the λi parameters then
becomes troublesome with such specification.
As discussed above, P ∗i (t) aims to capture the underlying price pattern of product
i, that we call price landing. For actual data we observe this pattern plus noise. The
observed prices may therefore differ from P ∗i (t). Furthermore, we only observe the prices
at regularly spaced intervals. We adopt the convention that we observe the prices for
product i at t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , Ti. We denote the observed price at time t by Pi(t). We
model the relation between the observed prices and price landing pattern using a first
order auto-regressive specification. In terms of the observed price this gives
Pi(t) = P
∗
i (t) + αi[Pi(t− 1)− P
∗
i (t− 1)] + εi(t) t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , Ti, (4)
where εi(t) denotes the source of the random deviation at time t from the underlying price
landing pattern, and αi determines the memory in the deviations from the underlying
pattern. We assume that εi(t) ∼ N(0, σ
2
i ) for t = 0, 1, . . . , Ti. If αi = 0 there is no
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memory, and (4) then states that the deviations are independent over time. If αi > 0, a
positive deviation at time t is likely to induce a positive deviation at time t+ 1. For the
first observation we set
Pi(0) = P
∗
i (0) +
√
1
1− α2
× εi(0). (5)
The variance factor is set such that the variance of the random term equals the uncondi-
tional variance of Pi(t) in (4).
4.2 Heterogeneity in Main Parameters
In the above discussion of the model we have explicitly allowed for heterogeneity, that
is, all parameters and the price cut trigger Di(t) are product-specific. In this section we
discuss how we model the heterogeneity in all parameters.
In the model we will allow for K different triggers, which are denoted by D1i(t),
D2i(t), . . ., DKi(t). The relationship between the observed price and the price landing in
(2) remains unchanged. In addition, we define a different price landing equation P ∗ki(t)
for each trigger variable k, that is,
P ∗ki(t) = κi + (ρi − κi)hki(t)
hki(t) = 1−
e
“
D
ki
(t)−λ
ki
νki
”
1 + e
“
D
ki
(t)−λ
ki
νki
” .
(6)
Note that this definition is very similar to that in (2) and (3). However, the parameters
λki and νki are now trigger (k) and product (i) specific. Note that the price starting and
landing level ρi and κi are the same across all k possible triggers.
The landing level (κi), the initial price level (ρi), the threshold value (λki) and the
speed of adjustment (νki) are defined to vary across products. For each of these param-
eters we specify a second-level model. For the price landing level and the launch prices
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we specify
κi = Z
′
iγ
κ + ωκi
ρi = Z
′
iγ
ρ + ωρi
with (ωκi , ω
ρ
i ) ∼ N(0,Σ), (7)
where Zi denotes a vector of dimension M of product specific characteristics, γ
κ and γρ
are coefficient vectors (dimension M × 1) common across all i products. The error terms
ωκi and ω
ρ
i are assumed to be normal with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σ. The Zi in our
model will include mainly product type, manufacturer variables and seasonal dummies.
We define the Zi variables with more detail in Section 4.5. We specify a similar form for
the speed and timing parameters. That is, for each trigger variable k we define
lnλki = Z
′
iγ
λ
k + η
λ
ki
ln νki = Z
′
iγ
ν
k + η
ν
ki
with (ηλki, η
ν
ki)
′ ∼ N(0,Ωk). (8)
where ηλki and η
ν
ki are the error terms and they are assumed to be normal with mean 0
and covariance matrix Ωk. The γ
λ
k and γ
ν
k are coefficients vectors (dimension M) and
Zi are the same group of group of covariates as in the equations for κi and ρi. The log
transformation in (8) is used to ensure that λki and νki are positive. If it is the case that
the timing and the speed of price landings are correlated we will capture this correlation
with the matrix Ωk. For example, it might be that when prices fall at a slower rate (ν
k
i )
they are cut at an earlier time (λki ).
4.3 Choice of Trigger and Mixture Specification
The actual trigger of the price landing for each product is of course unobserved to the
researcher. We denote this (unobserved) variable as Si, that is, we denote Si = k if
the trigger variable k is selected for product i. We complete this part of the model by
specifying probabilities for each trigger, that is, the trigger k is selected with probability
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pik for k = 1, 2, . . . , K. In our application k = 1 would mean that time is the trigger, k = 2
means that cumulative sales are the trigger and k = 3 means that cumulative competitive
introductions are the main trigger of equation (2). In the four-trigger version of our
model k = 4 means that the release schedule of firms are the main trigger. We provide
more details on how we measure each trigger variable in subsection 4.5. The probabilities
pik will reflect the overall likelihood of each of the different triggers. However, note that
conditionally on the observed prices, the probability of Si = k is different across games.
It is important to note that the trigger variables might be correlated with each other
in time but this correlation does not prevent the identification of the more likely trigger
for each video-game. The reason is that we aim to identify the distribution of the game-
specific thresholds for each trigger variable and the game-specific threshold after which
prices land. For example, the price landings of video-games might occur, according to
its distribution, around the sixth month after launch but the sixth month represents
many different levels of cumulative sales for the video-games in our sample. It might
be that some video-games sold in total 10 thousand units during these six months while
other video-games sold more than 500 thousand units. That is, the time correlation
between trigger variables does not necessarily translate into a correlation between the
game-specific thresholds that we are aiming to identify.
In Figure 7 we describe the intuition about how triggers are selected and statistically
identified. For this purpose we need two main elements. The first element consists of
the distributions of the threshold parameters for each of the different triggers. That is,
the distribution of λki and νki across all i and for each k. For example, if we collect the
parameter λ1i for all i we obtain the distribution of λ for the first trigger variable. As
we defined in equation (8), the distribution of λki and νki depend on co-variates Zi and
hyper-parameters γk and the variance term associated to them. The second element we
need is the match between the price landing of game i and the distributions of λki and
νki for k = 1, . . . , K.
In Figure 7 we plot again the price of the Spider-Man. In addition, we plot a hypo-
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thetical distribution of the threshold parameters λki for each of the mixture components
k. The distribution of λ1i in the upper left panel, λ2i in the upper right panel and λ3i in
the lower left panel. Note that λ1i is the time (in months) after which the price drops (if
Di(t) is time, that is when k = 1). In the same way, if Di(t) is cumulative sales then λ2i
is the cumulative number of sales after which the price drops and λ3i is the cumulative
number of competitive introductions after which the price drops when Di(t) amounts to
competitive introductions. We notice that the λˆ1i ≈ 11 months, that λˆ2i ≈ 600 thousand
units and that λˆ3i ≈ 250 units. Given the λki thresholds we can now compare them
against the corresponding distributions. In this case we see that the λˆ2i is the closest to
the mode of its corresponding distribution. Hence, the most likely trigger of the Spider-
Man price landing is sales. The least likely trigger is competition and next is time. Of
course, in our model we take into account the distribution of λki and νki simultaneously
when we draw the most likely trigger for each video-game in our sample. All technical
details about trigger selection are given in the Appendix A. Next we describe how we
model heterogeneity in the mixture components.
4.4 Heterogeneity in Mixture Probabilities
We suspect that there also might be heterogeneity in the mixture probabilities across
games. For example, the games of some publishers may be more likely to belong to the
time mixture. Hence, as an extension to the model we allow the probabilities of Si = k
to depend on a set of product specific variables. To model this dependence we specify a
Multinomial Probit Model for Si. Hence, we introduce additional latent variables y
∗
i for
i = 1, . . . , N and k = 1, . . . , K. These latent variables are related to Si by
Si = k if and only if y
∗
ki = max(y
∗
li
l=1...K
). (9)
We specify y∗ki as
y∗ki = Z
′
iδk + ϑik with ϑi ∼ N(0, I), (10)
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where ϑi = (ϑ1i,ϑ2i,, ..., ϑKi) and we set δ1 = 0 for identification. In principle the set of
variables used in this specification may differ from that in (6) and (7). The probability
that the trigger k is used for product i now becomes
piki = Pr[y
∗
ki = max(y
∗
li)
l=1...K
]. (11)
This concludes our model specification. For inference we will rely on MCMC and Bayesian
analysis and treat all product specific parameters as latent variables and we sample these
together with the parameters in (6), (7) and (8). A complete description of the sampling
steps in this Markov Chain can be found in the Appendix A.
4.5 Model Specifics for Video-Games Pricing Model
We consider two versions of our model. The first version uses three trigger variables
and the second uses four trigger variables. We define Dki(t), for k = 1, 2, 3, 4 where
D1i(t) = Ai(t) , D2i(t) = Ci(t) and D3i(t) = Ii(t) and D4i(t) = Ri(t) . Ai(t) is defined
as the age of a video-game in months, that is, the time between launch and t. Ci(t) is
the cumulative sales of video-game i between release date and t. Ii(t) is defined as the
cumulative number of video-games introduced between the launch date of video-game i
and t. Ri(t) is defined as the release schedule of the firm that released product i. We
know the number of games a firm released at every point in time. To create Ri(t), we
use a time window that sums the introductions from the introduction of game i up to
the next three months after t.
The interpretation of λki and νki varies depending on the trigger k. Hence, λ1i can be
interpreted as the price landing time, λ2i as a competitive threshold, λ3i as the hard-core
gamer segment size and λ4i as a release limit after which we observe a price drop. For
each of these triggers, the parameter νki for k = 1, 2, 3, 4 can be interpreted as a scaling
constant that changes the speed at which the price landing occurs.
In all what follows in this section we focus on the model with three triggers, that
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is k = 1, 2, 3 and we leave out Ri(t). The reason for this is that Ri(t) is selected with
a probability very close to zero when we include it as the fourth trigger variable. We
present the discussion regarding the fourth trigger in our results in section 5.2.
The hierarchical structure of the corresponding threshold λki, speed νki and ρi and
κi parameters for each mixture component will depend on a set of Zi variables that
contain game type, publisher and seasonal effects plus the launch price and the time to
the introduction of a new game consoles as co-variates. Seasonal dummies are defined
by the month of launch of each video-game i. The launch price is the observed price
of video game i at launch time, that is at t = 0. We include this variable in order to
test if our co-variates remain significant after including past prices in the equation for
the timing and speed of launch. It might be that the price at launch of a VG might
contain information regarding the timing of the price landing and its speed. In addition,
we believe it is reasonable to include the launch price because of the very likely uni-
directional relationship between launch price and timing of price landing. That is, it is
very hard to argue that a firm decides how to price a VG’s based on its decision on when
to permanently cut its price; on the other hand, it might be that firms decide to cut prices
based on the launch price. For example, firms might cut the price of expensive games
after longer time than the time they wait to cut the price of cheaper VG’s. Moreover, the
launch price is a proxy for quality and hence we test if our covariates remain significant
after we control for them.
The time to console launch measures the time (in months) between a video-game
release and the launch of the VG’s console that is being released after the video-game
introduction. For example, the PlayStation2 with DS controllers was introduced in June
1998 and other versions of the PS2 console were released in February 1999 and January
2002. This means that a video-game released in January 1998 will face a console in-
troduction after 6 months; a video-game released in January 1997 will face a release in
18 months, and so on. For each video-game we calculate the time between its release
and the forthcoming console at the video-game release date. We include this variable to
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test whether the price landing pattern varies relative to the release date of video-game
consoles. Our results do not significantly change if we leave both time to console launch
and launch price out of the Zi covariates.
From the seasonal fixed effects we excluded January, from the game types we excluded
Adventure games. The remaining game type categories are: Action, Arcade, Children,
Driving, Family, Fighting, Role playing, Shooter, Sports, Strategy and Compilations.
The remaining publisher dummies are Electronic Arts, Acclaim, Infogames, Konami,
Activision, Midway, Eidos Interactive, THQ, Capcom, Namco, Agetec, Interplay, Hasbro,
2nd group, 3rd group and 4th group. The 2nd group is composed by six publishers that
each have at least 1% market share, the 3nd group is composed by 14 publishers that
account for the next 10% market share and the 4th group is composed by 43 publishers
that account for less than 1% of the market share in total. In all our tables we sorted
publishers by their market share and in descending order. The main publishers (EA,
Acclaim, etc.) account for 80% of the VG’s in our sample while the dummies for 2nd, 3rd
and 4th publishers group the next 20% of the market share. We set Sony as the reference
publisher.
5 Results
In this section we present our results in three subsections. In the first we present results
regarding the heterogeneity of the parameters. Next we present the results regarding
trigger selection and finally we discuss the model performance.
5.1 Heterogeneity of Landing Time and Speed
Our results indicate that there indeed exists heterogeneity in the model parameters. The
first contribution we have to offer is that we find significant firm effects on both the timing
and speed parameters across all mixtures. That is, firms might be deciding not only on
when to cut the price but also on how fast to cut it. To our knowledge, this result is
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new and we are the first to show it empirically. In Table 2 and in Table 3 we can see
the different firm effects across mixtures and model parameters. For example, Acclaim’s
landing time (λi) coefficient in the time mixture is −0.196 and this means that VG’s of
Acclaim face a price drop 17.8% earlier relative to Sony. In addition, we find several of
the firm effects on the landing speed (νi) to be significant. For example, Electronic Arts
has a ν that is 91.7 % higher than Sony while Agetec has a slower landing speed with
a ν parameter that is 3.81 times higher than Sony. An interesting feature of the time
mixture parameters is that most of the firm effects log(λ1i) are negative while the firm
effects for the log(ν1i) are positive. That is, it seems that the video-game prices of most
firms are cut at earlier dates than Sony but most firms cut prices at slower speed relative
to Sony.
In the last four columns of Table 3 we report the results for the hierarchical specifica-
tion of the initial and landing price levels, (7). In both cases we observe very important
firm effects. For example, Konami sets the landing prices 2.535 USD above the land-
ing prices of Sony, 17.34 USD, while the launch prices of Konami are not significantly
different than those of Sony that start at 40.49.
We give a histogram of the posterior mean of the game-specific parameters of the
three-mixture model in Figure 8, Figure 9 and for the auto-regressive term of equation
(4) in Figure 10. The dispersion in the timing and speed parameters is reported in Figure
9. We can see that each mixture has quite different thresholds and speeds. For example,
the time mixture mean is around 7 months. That is, firms cut VG’s prices mainly in the
7th month after their release. The timing parameters for all mixtures are graphed in the
left frames while in the right frames we present the speed parameter distribution. We
note that if the speed parameter νi is close to zero then prices fall more steeply. From the
histograms in the right panels of Figure 9 we see that several products face sharp price
cuts. In addition, in Figure 8 we see the distribution of the starting price level ρi for all
i in the left frame and the distribution of the κi in the right frame. These parameters
show that the starting level might be as low as 20 USD and as high as 70 USD while the
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landing level is as low as 5 USD and as high as 35 USD.
In summary we find that firm effects are important to describe the price landing
timing and to describe its speed, the launch and the landing prices of the VG’s in our
sample. Seasonality is more important for the starting and landing levels of prices and
less so for the price landing timing and speed. We also find that for some mixtures the
effect of the launch price and the time to launch a new console are significant for some
of the main parameters.
5.2 Triggers of Price Landings
Our second contribution is that we find that the triggers that best describe price landings
are competitive introductions and time and not cumulative sales. In Figure 11 we report
a histogram of the posterior probability of each of the triggers across all games in the
three-mixture version of our model.
The academic convention is that sales should be a main price driver. In contrast,
we find that the sales indicator is the least likely trigger variable of price landings and
it is useful to explain only a 12% of the video-games in our sample. Note that we do
not go against the academic convention that posits that sales are a price driver. Our
results only indicate that sales are not the main price landing trigger. Furthermore,
we find that the competition indicator, measured by competitive VG’s introductions, is
the likely trigger of price landings of approximately 25.7% of the VGs in our sample.
The study of Nair (2007) finds no evidence of important substitution patterns between
video-games and hence he suggests that competition, at the game-specific level, is not
important to explain video-game prices. Our model cannot provide insights regarding the
individual level competition between different video-games but we find that competition,
measured as the cummulative sum of VG’s introductions, is a likely trigger of price
landings. Finally, we find that the most likely trigger is time itself or in other words,
the most probable trigger is simply the age of a video-game. The time mixture has a
posterior mean probability of 62.21%.
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In the fourth-mixture version of our model we tested a fourth trigger without much
success. The additional mixture included the release schedule of firms as trigger. The
idea was to test whether firms release schedule could have a large probability relative to
the other three trigger variables. Firms usually have information on the dates that their
new VG’s are to be released and therefore the prices of their previously released VG’s
could depend on the dates of these new introductions. Our data include the number of
games each firm released at every point in time and therefore we also know the number of
games each firm will release after each point in time. Hence, we sum the VG’s introduc-
tions before time t up to the introductions in the next three months after t and this sum
is the value of Di(t). Note that Di(t) is then the release schedule of the manufacturer
of the video-game i at time t. We decided to use a three-months time window because
most online sources of VG’s releases cover, as a maximum, the upcoming three months.
Of course, in our database we just know the release schedule perfectly. However, our
results indicate that the probability of this latter trigger mixture is on average very close
zero. Our conclusion is that price landings are better described by the entire market
introductions rather than the release schedule of any single firm. This makes some sense
given that the 78 VG’s firms in our sample face on average 29 releases per month. Conse-
quently, firms might be more likely to monitor all market introductions rather than their
own product introductions.
5.3 Model with Hierarchical Specification in the Mixture Prob-
abilities
We estimate the same specification of our model but now we add a hierarchical spec-
ification in the mixture probabilities. In this section we discuss the estimates of this
hierarchical specification and in the Appendix A we provide its technical details.
The estimates of the parameters in the hierarchical structure of the mixture probabil-
ities are reported in Table 4. In contrast with the heterogeneity in the main parameters
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we do not find substantial heterogeneity in the mixture probabilities. For example, we
find only three significant publisher effects (Konami, Activision, Midway) in the latent
utility of sales and two significant publisher effects (Capcom and Interplay) in the latent
utility of the time mixture. That is, we know that there is heterogeneity in the timing
and speed of price landings but we do not know why a trigger is more likely than the
others. We consider this an area for further research.
5.4 Model Performance
We compare the out-of-sample performance of our model against two models: A naive
model for prices, that is an AR(1), and against an alternative version of our model.
In this alternative model we use the same specification and parameters and the same
number of mixtures as our model but we replace all triggers with time. That is, Di(t) =
time for all k mixture components. We randomly selected 50 video-games and used
their first six observations to forecast their complete series. That is, only the first six
observations of these 50 games were used for parameter estimation while we continue to
use all observations for all other games. These comparisons are reported in Table 5 and
in Table 6.
Our model preforms extremely well when compared against the AR(1) model and
reasonably well when compared against the restricted model. In Table 5 we see that our
model forecasts prices better than a naive AR(1) model for 40 out of the 50 randomly
chosen games. We report the root mean square forecast error and the log of the predictive
density for all 50 VG’s. More details on how we compute the predictive density are given
in the Appendix A. Moreover, our model performs better than the model with three time
mixtures for 19 out of the same 50 games and in 18 other cases it performs equally well
as the alternative specification. In total 37 out of 50 games our specification performs at
least as well as the alternative or better. This means that there is information contained
in past sales and the competition mixtures that increase our model fit.
The AR(1) model does not capture the timing of significant price cuts and the speed at
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which the price cut occurs while our model captures these significant price cuts. Nonethe-
less, the assumption that prices follow an AR(1) pattern is common in previous marketing
literature and our evidence suggests that this model performs poorly. The main reason is
that new products face significant price cuts during their life-cycle and hence the AR(1) is
not a suitable specification for such price patterns. At the moment and to our knowledge,
we are the first to propose an empirical model that captures these price dynamics.
The results we presented in the previous sections are robust to different model spec-
ifications. For example, we estimated the model without the hierarchical specifications
of all its parameters and the price landing timing and speed parameters stay about the
same. Furthermore, we estimated the model without the auto-regressive structure in
(4) and (5), and again the main parameters are estimated similarly. A reason why our
results stay the same is that the pricing equation in (2) can accommodate many differ-
ent pricing patterns with only four parameters and that we let these parameters to be
product-specific. These four parameters are the initial and landing price levels, ρi and
κi, and the timing and speed of price landings, the λi and νi.
6 Conclusions
Our aim with this article was to model the dynamics of new product price landing
patterns. Price landings usually follow the inverse of the well known S-shape of sales.
Nonetheless, we found no empirical studies dealing with these regularities of new product
prices.
In this article we were concerned with products that face one significant price cut dur-
ing their life cycle. Several online price trackers report similar dynamics to a wider range
of products like mobile phones, cameras, storage media, books, etc. Our data was col-
lected by NPDGroup but several websites like www.pricescan.com or www.streetprices.com
let their users plot price trends and indeed it is relatively easy to find many other products
facing a single and significant price drop during their lifetime. We believe that knowing
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when a price is cut or when to significantly cut the price of a product permanently is
an exciting area of further research and one with wide managerial implications across
different industries.
In this article we provided evidence that there is heterogeneity both in the timing
and speed of price landings. We found that most of this heterogeneity is driven by firm
effects. Our model captures this heterogeneity and it is flexible and useful to forecast
and describe the price landing patterns in our data. Finally, we found that it is the age
of a video-game that is triggering the price landings. The next most likely trigger is
competition and the least likely is cumulative sales. This latter finding goes against the
academic convention that sales are the main driver of prices. At least for our application
we found convincing evidence that sales are not the most likely trigger of significant price
cuts.
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Figure 1: Price Landing Pattern for 50 Randomly Selected Games
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Figure 2: Typical Price Landing Pattern
28
Figure 3: The Video-Games Market
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Figure 4: What do publishers sell?
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Figure 5: Total Sales Distribution
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Figure 6: Main Pricing Function at Different Parameter Values
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Figure 7: Identification of Triggers
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Figure 8: Histogram of the Posterior Mean of Starting (ρi) and Landing Price (κi) Pa-
rameters
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Figure 10: Histogram of the Posterior Mean of the αi Parameters
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NEW PRODUCTS PRICING STUDIES
Price Change Price Mimics When to Main Price
Author (Journal, Year) Approach Speed Diffusion cut prices Driver
Bass and Bultez (1982) Analytical – Yes No Saturation
Bayus (1994) Empirical Gradual No* No Saturation
Bayus (1992) Analytical Gradual Maybe* No Learning Curve + Consumer Heterogeneity + Entry
Clements and Ohashi (2005) Empirical Gradual No No Saturation + Indirect Network Effects
Chintagunta et al. (2009) Empirical Gradual No No Saturation + Marketing Mix
Dockner and Gaunersdorfer (1996) Analytical Gradual No* No Saturation + Entry
Dockner and Jorgensen (1988) Analytical Gradual Yes* No Learning Curve + Saturation
Dolan and Jeuland (1981) Analytical Gradual Maybe* No Learning Curve
Eliashberg and Jeuland (1986) Analytical Jumps No* No Entry
Feng and Gallego (1995) Analytical Jumps No Yes Saturation
Ferguson and Koenigsberg (2007) Analytical Jumps No Yes Deteriorating Inventory
Franza and Gaimon (1998) Analytical Gradual No Yes Entry Timing + Saturation + Learning Curve
Gupta and Di Benedetto (2007) Analytical Gradual No Yes Entry + Advertising
Gupta et al. (2006) Analytical Jumps No Yes Deteriorating Inventory + Consumer Valuations
Horsky (1990) Empirical Gradual Yes* No Saturation
Kalish (1985) Empirical Gradual No No Advertising
Kalish (1983) Analytical Gradual Yes* No Learning Curve + Saturation
Kalish and Lilien (1983) Analytical Gradual Yes* No Saturation
Kornish (2001) Analytical Gradual No* No Entry (New Product Generations)
Krishnan et al. (1999) Analytical Gradual No Yes Saturation
Nair (2007) Empirical Jumps No Yes Consumer Heterogeneity + Expectations
Nascimento and Vanhonacker (1993) Analytical Gradual No No Consumer Heterogeneity + New Product Generations
Padmanabhan and Bass (1993) Analytical Jumps No Yes Entry + New Product Generations
Parker (1992) Empirical – No No Saturation
Rajan et al. (1992) Analytical Jumps Yes Yes Saturation
Rao and Bass (1985) Analytical Gradual Yes – Learning Curves + Saturation
Raman and Chatterjee (1995) Analytical Gradual Yes No Saturation
Robinson and Lakhani (1975) Analytical Gradual No* No Saturation
Schmalen (1982) Analytical Jumps No No Entry
Simon (1979) Empirical Gradual No Yes Saturation
Teng and Thompson (1996) Analytical Jumps No Yes Saturation + Quality
Zhao and Zheng (2000) Analytical Jumps No Yes Consumer Heterogeneity
Note: *The study supports price skimming
Table 1: Literature Review on New Products Pricing
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Mixture (1) D(t)= VG’s Age Mixture (2) D(t) = Cumulative VG’s Introductions
Landing Time Landing Speed Competitive Landing Speed
log(λi) log(νi) Threshold log(λi) log(νi)
Intercept 1.887*** (0.266) -0.575 (0.627) 1.273*** (0.389) 2.419** (0.914)
Game Type
Action -0.234* (0.122) -0.172 (0.307) -0.050 (0.205) -0.197 (0.378)
Arcade -0.248 (0.186) -0.715 (0.500) -1.909 (1.517) -2.508 (2.354)
Children -0.266 (0.217) -0.250 (0.526) 0.380 (0.286) -1.575** (0.695)
Driving -0.350** (0.133) -0.400 (0.334) -0.308 (0.195) -0.200 (0.393)
Family -0.378** (0.178) 0.459 (0.417) 0.504* (0.281) -0.602 (0.529)
Fighting -0.295* (0.145) -0.120 (0.347) -0.218 (0.224) -0.607 (0.543)
Role playing -0.056 (0.143) -0.493 (0.381) -0.060 (0.207) -0.060 (0.502)
Shooter -0.646*** (0.134) -0.006 (0.334) -0.182 (0.188) -0.085 (0.357)
Sports -0.276** (0.123) -0.249 (0.313) -0.096 (0.179) -0.056 (0.382)
Strategy -0.269 (0.176) -0.383 (0.393) -0.142 (0.212) -0.329 (0.470)
Compilations -0.342 (0.220) 1.116** (0.503) -2.450*** (0.473) -5.903*** (1.389)
Publisher
Electronic Arts -0.014 (0.079) 1.226*** (0.211) -0.220 (0.133) -0.022 (0.298)
Acclaim -0.196* (0.105) 1.106*** (0.288) -0.507*** (0.162) 0.253 (0.328)
Infogames -0.234 (0.147) 1.016*** (0.327) -0.690*** (0.196) -0.020 (0.345)
Konami -0.387*** (0.122) 0.446 (0.344) -0.042 (0.179) 0.144 (0.412)
Activision -0.280** (0.111) 0.693** (0.291) -0.020 (0.201) 0.146 (0.445)
Midway 0.039 (0.124) 1.665*** (0.345) -0.281 (0.221) 0.115 (0.423)
Eidos Interactive -0.791*** (0.123) 1.434*** (0.308) -0.697*** (0.187) -0.248 (0.522)
THQ -0.320** (0.157) 1.621*** (0.414) -0.693* (0.336) 0.338 (0.529)
Capcom -0.109 (0.128) 0.657 (0.410) -0.108 (0.199) 0.356 (0.416)
Namco 0.218 (0.159) 2.109*** (0.457) 0.416** (0.206) -0.648 (0.965)
Agetec -0.132 (0.183) 2.147*** (0.429) -4.106*** (1.190) -5.610*** (1.620)
Interplay -0.758*** (0.130) 1.470*** (0.310) -1.798*** (0.423) -1.436 (1.074)
Hasbro -0.097 (0.150) 0.941** (0.392) -1.016 (0.970) 0.910 (1.626)
2nd Publishers -0.461*** (0.099) 1.335*** (0.254) -0.388** (0.182) 0.154 (0.488)
3rd Publishers -0.299*** (0.096) 0.942*** (0.269) -0.636*** (0.142) 0.066 (0.336)
4th Publishers -0.399*** (0.109) 1.334*** (0.267) -0.386** (0.176) 0.410 (0.382)
Season
Feb -0.183 (0.150) -0.561 (0.429) 0.014 (0.235) -0.364 (0.767)
Mar -0.111 (0.140) -0.564 (0.389) -0.125 (0.223) -0.403 (0.627)
Apr -0.056 (0.162) -0.218 (0.452) -0.421 (0.267) -0.514 (0.810)
May -0.142 (0.154) -0.549 (0.456) -0.199 (0.247) 0.110 (0.701)
Jun 0.050 (0.154) -0.947** (0.443) -0.259 (0.253) -1.087 (0.718)
Jul -0.224 (0.173) -0.354 (0.530) -0.249 (0.265) -1.023 (0.907)
Aug 0.045 (0.153) -0.474 (0.397) -0.154 (0.276) -0.550 (0.741)
Sep -0.014 (0.130) -0.469 (0.387) 0.023 (0.213) -0.215 (0.673)
Oct -0.129 (0.137) -0.402 (0.393) -0.042 (0.211) -0.358 (0.677)
Nov -0.109 (0.128) -0.393 (0.373) 0.054 (0.194) -0.309 (0.678)
Dec -0.229* (0.140) -0.420 (0.421) -0.287 (0.231) -0.198 (0.789)
Other covariates
Launch Price 0.018*** (0.005) 0.003 (0.012) 0.048*** (0.007) -0.025 (0.019)
Time to Console Launch -0.005 (0.004) -0.002 (0.009) -0.021*** (0.006) 0.027** (0.011)
Notes: Posterior standard deviation between parentheses. *,**,*** indicate zero is not contained in the 90, 95 and 99% highest posterior density region
Table 2: Estimation Results Part I
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Mixture (3) D(t)=Cumulative Sales All Mixtures
Sales Threshold Landing Speed Landing Starting
log(λi) log(νi) Price κi Price ρi
Intercept 2.579 (1.810) 4.133*** (1.363) 17.34*** (1.510) 40.79*** (2.046)
Game Type
Action -0.431 (1.179) 0.161 (0.829) 0.751 (0.987) -1.793 (1.297)
Arcade -1.171 (1.567) -1.866 (1.145) 0.543 (1.492) -5.244*** (1.969)
Children -1.696 (1.887) 0.551 (1.245) -1.128 (1.456) -10.46*** (2.092)
Driving 0.342 (1.203) 1.040 (0.718) -0.243 (1.007) -1.363 (1.299)
Family 0.705 (1.641) -0.012 (1.243) -1.111 (1.225) -5.322*** (1.627)
Fighting -1.416 (1.129) -0.974 (0.814) 2.061* (1.109) 0.378 (1.443)
Role playing 2.021 (1.730) 0.067 (1.356) 3.162*** (1.180) 1.033 (1.460)
Shooter -0.823 (1.230) 0.170 (0.901) -0.310 (1.056) 2.050 (1.372)
Sports -1.147 (1.301) -1.369* (0.845) -0.987 (0.983) -1.450 (1.301)
Strategy -1.545 (1.640) -0.462 (1.271) 2.364* (1.240) 1.290 (1.592)
Compilations -0.603 (1.732) 2.599** (1.185) -7.490*** (1.534) 8.880*** (3.272)
Publisher
Electronic Arts 3.395*** (0.647) 2.077*** (0.442) 1.135* (0.671) 1.712** (0.807)
Acclaim 0.904 (0.782) 0.039 (0.619) -1.572* (0.865) 1.617 (1.124)
Infogames 0.049 (0.664) 0.119 (0.577) -1.766** (0.888) 1.262 (1.289)
Konami 2.240** (1.090) -0.037 (0.656) 2.535*** (0.979) 0.586 (1.199)
Activision 2.886** (1.078) 1.683*** (0.651) -1.105 (0.962) -0.439 (1.196)
Midway 1.346 (1.018) -0.030 (0.875) -1.617 (1.054) 2.344* (1.339)
Eidos Interactive 1.674 (1.142) 1.537*** (0.747) -2.009** (1.013) 5.029*** (1.421)
THQ 5.719*** (1.126) 2.341*** (0.888) -0.919 (1.172) 2.005 (1.656)
Capcom 2.154 (1.326) 2.476*** (0.869) 1.540 (1.070) -0.874 (1.324)
Namco -2.462 (4.770) -2.518 (2.743) 1.433 (1.554) 2.235 (1.597)
Agetec 0.806 (1.182) -0.472 (0.714) -3.267** (1.427) 3.487 (2.106)
Interplay 1.134 (1.241) 2.043*** (0.814) -0.778 (1.127) 9.382*** (1.741)
Hasbro 0.816 (1.009) -1.433 (1.460) -3.545*** (1.289) -4.731*** (1.720)
2nd Publishers 0.398 (0.933) -0.035 (0.909) -3.134*** (0.767) 1.892* (1.081)
3rd Publishers -0.212 (0.597) 0.007 (0.454) -1.124 (0.702) 1.947** (0.943)
4th Publishers 1.356* (0.779) 0.408 (0.567) -3.216*** (0.815) 0.771 (1.212)
Season
Feb -1.274 (2.237) -0.508 (1.474) -0.121 (1.254) -2.178 (1.747)
Mar 0.364 (1.099) -0.344 (0.890) 2.038* (1.123) -2.663* (1.559)
Apr -10.56*** (3.330) -8.255*** (2.689) 2.306* (1.375) 0.148 (1.878)
May -12.00*** (2.095) -8.820*** (1.870) 1.499 (1.281) -1.118 (1.811)
Jun -11.45*** (2.627) -8.422*** (1.864) 3.648*** (1.230) -3.058* (1.717)
Jul -3.430** (1.819) -3.950*** (1.306) 1.227 (1.367) -1.847 (1.926)
Aug 1.129 (1.519) 0.173 (1.202) 0.236 (1.235) -3.719** (1.655)
Sep 0.739 (0.877) 0.840 (0.709) 1.397 (1.088) -2.537 (1.536)
Oct 0.849 (0.892) 0.652 (0.761) 1.112 (1.124) -0.832 (1.573)
Nov 0.588 (0.990) 0.597 (0.720) 0.617 (1.073) -0.965 (1.498)
Dec 0.109 (0.982) 0.358 (0.766) 2.150* (1.173) 0.534 (1.682)
Launch Info
Launch Price 0.155*** (0.018) 0.068*** (0.015) – – – –
Time to Console Launch -0.122*** (0.025) -0.059*** (0.018) 0.127*** (0.025) 0.401*** (0.033)
Notes: Posterior standard deviation between parentheses. *,**,*** indicate zero is not contained in the 90, 95 and 99% highest posterior density region
Table 3: Estimation Results Part II
40
Latent
Utility
of Sales
Mixture
Latent
Utility
of Time
Mixture
Intercept 3.727*** (0.579) 0.549 (0.445)
Game Type
Action 0.699* (0.360) 0.260 (0.269)
Arcade -0.032 (0.543) 0.404 (0.451)
Children 0.481 (0.479) 0.005 (0.456)
Driving 0.708* (0.402) 0.288 (0.278)
Family -0.100 (0.451) -0.577* (0.333)
Fighting 1.153*** (0.427) 0.357 (0.372)
Role playing -0.304 (0.552) -0.146 (0.355)
Shooter 0.809 (0.567) 0.716** (0.297)
Sports -0.010 (0.372) 0.057 (0.252)
Strategy 0.342 (0.613) -0.055 (0.362)
Compilations 0.930* (0.530) -0.258 (0.438)
Publisher
Electronic Arts -0.689 (0.514) -0.137 (0.239)
Acclaim -0.723 (0.583) -0.365 (0.284)
Infogames 0.723 (0.456) -0.332 (0.360)
Konami 1.110** (0.469) 0.068 (0.343)
Activision 1.060** (0.450) 0.356 (0.325)
Midway 0.884* (0.454) -0.119 (0.384)
Eidos Interactive 0.002 (0.668) 0.265 (0.365)
THQ -0.287 (0.531) -0.017 (0.459)
Capcom -0.355 (0.451) -0.821** (0.357)
Namco -0.043 (0.649) -0.503 (0.426)
Agetec 0.592 (0.558) 0.592 (0.512)
Interplay 0.648 (0.626) 0.800* (0.430)
Hasbro -0.364 (0.512) 0.303 (0.380)
2nd Publishers 0.203 (0.427) 0.387 (0.305)
3rd Publishers 0.324 (0.402) -0.025 (0.272)
4th Publishers 0.510 (0.374) 0.164 (0.301)
Season
Feb 0.159 (0.467) -0.026 (0.361)
Mar 0.002 (0.454) 0.441 (0.297)
Apr 0.448 (0.575) 0.296 (0.431)
May -0.309 (0.499) -0.361 (0.344)
Jun 0.067 (0.533) 0.709** (0.381)
Jul 0.149 (0.547) 0.007 (0.417)
Aug -0.197 (0.479) 0.355 (0.367)
Sep 0.008 (0.373) -0.214 (0.259)
Oct 0.156 (0.410) 0.285 (0.293)
Nov 0.070 (0.357) 0.069 (0.243)
Dec 0.666 (0.418) 0.329 (0.307)
Launch Info
Launch Price -0.162*** (0.013) 0.004 (0.007)
Time to Launch 0.010 (0.015) -0.012 (0.008)
Notes: Posterior standard deviation in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate zero
is not contained in the 90, 95, and 99% highest posterior density region.
Table 4: Results of Hierarchical Structure for Mixture Probabilities
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Game Title
Forecasted
Months
St. Dev.
Price
Forecast
RMSE
Forecast
RMSE
AR(1)
Log of
Pre-
dicted
Density
Log Like-
lihood of
predicted
AR (1)
NHL 2001 10 0.18 0.17 0.15 -0.89* -3.47
JJ’S VR FOOTBALL 98 8 2.39 1.76* 5.19 -5.06* -6.79
HIGH HEAT BSBALL 2002 18 7.14 2.18* 11.92 -10.25* -142.23
MADDEN NFL 98 12 4.56 2.55* 5.03 -11.05* -27.81
MR DOMINO 18 8.33 3.10* 12.34 -17.22* -188.45
THE CROW CITY ANGELS 18 14.53 3.24* 26.27 -12.15* -369.19
PITBALL 18 13.49 3.72* 27.92 -12.50* -264.59
FROGGER 2 18 10.48 3.86* 22.53 -12.30* -2421.81
BIG OL’ BASS 2 18 14.45 3.92* 22.63 -15.22* -485.79
MK & ASHLEY WINNER’S 18 11.88 4.11* 17.46 -11.90* -493.25
CIVILIZATION 2 18 9.73 4.25* 12.52 -8.94* -1009.23
PONG 18 11.43 4.37* 20.81 -14.54* -646.32
ROGUE TRIP 14 1.80 4.38 1.90 -16.24 -0.58
RESIDENT EVIL 3:NEMES 18 10.16 4.70* 10.34 -15.91* -71.64
ETERNAL EYES 18 8.31 4.92* 9.45 -24.18* -82.53
TEKKEN 2 18 7.39 5.13* 8.54 -15.13* -85.26
TEST DRIVE 4 18 11.50 5.39* 28.29 -12.53* -511.42
F1 WRLD GRAND PRIX 00 18 7.11 5.63* 7.52 -29.76* -50.37
FADE TO BLACK 18 9.09 5.88* 8.58 -21.99* -38.53
SHEEP RAIDER 18 9.35 6.03* 11.20 -81.57* -112.25
G POLICE2:WPN JUSTICE 9 10.79 6.04* 24.87 -8.60* -386.84
RISK 10 9.50 6.55* 12.39 -13.02* -267.31
SYNDICATE WARS 18 8.93 6.66* 12.83 -16.71* -55.53
JUGGERNAUT 18 9.33 6.71* 16.33 -51.62* -60.97
KISS PINBALL 10 8.47 6.73* 13.79 -11.21* -128.41
BACKYARD SOCCER 18 16.59 6.74* 23.35 -24.94* -652.10
OLYMPIC SUMMER GAMES 18 8.57 7.02* 12.52 -16.79* -38.77
NECTARIS:MILITARY MAD 18 13.34 7.06* 19.63 -16.75* -292.34
T.CLANCYS ROGUE SPEAR 18 5.38 7.88 4.54 -21.11 -16.62
TOCA 2 CAR CHALLENGE 18 13.75 7.97* 13.93 -23.36* -177.86
NFL XTREME 2 18 14.35 8.27* 24.53 -20.69* -467.21
ARENA FOOTBALL 17 3.40 8.35 4.08 -14.76* -23.53
FINAL FANTASY IX 13 6.23 8.43* 12.81 -10.78* -32.38
SHEEP 18 3.47 8.83 3.54 -22.08 -4.11
SIMPSON’S WRESTLING 12 8.66 8.87* 12.12 -16.69* -31.70
POCKET FIGHTER 18 10.51 9.02* 17.25 -17.09* -169.35
POWERBOAT RACING 18 10.50 9.19* 24.08 -14.13* -466.81
GRAND SLAM 97 18 11.09 9.53* 11.69 -24.66* -121.27
RAMPAGE WORLD TOUR 6 2.88 9.67 4.58 -1245.7 -6.05
EAGLE ONE: HARRIER 13 11.43 10.5* 13.02 -50.33* -847.83
STRIKER PRO 2000 9 10.66 10.6* 20.87 -10.52* -139.91
NEWMAN/HAAS RACING 16 3.88 11.31 4.63 -38.44 -4.55
DISCWRLD 2:MRTLY BYTE 18 6.31 11.42 5.95 -87.15* -41.79
CROSSROAD CRISIS 18 9.77 12.4* 15.33 -93.93* -458.48
SLAM N JAM 96 18 10.23 13.3* 19.53 -18.82* -280.41
NBA LIVE 2002 18 9.23 14.4* 21.76 -80.22* -466.39
ARMD COR 2 PRJ PNTSMA 15 8.71 15.0* 16.21 -11.77* -263.19
CRASH TEAM RACING 18 15.92 15.8* 17.91 -342.07 -117.05
DISNEY’S DINOSAUR 18 5.00 16.35 5.68 -27.82 -15.57
NFL BLITZ 2000 18 5.63 17.57 6.41 -30.46* -130.64
Notes: * Means the RMSE or the predictive likelihood is smaller in our model than in the AR(1)
Table 5: Forecasting Performance
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Log of Predictive Log of Predicted
Forecast St.Dev. Density (LPD) Density (LDP)
Game Title Horizon Pricea Original Model Alt. Model
NHL 2001 10 0.18 -0.89 * -0.90
JJ’S VR FOOTBALL 98 8 2.39 -5.06 * -4.89
HIGH HEAT BSBALL 2002 18 7.14 -10.25 * -9.92
MADDEN NFL 98 12 4.56 -11.05 * -11.12
MR DOMINO 18 8.33 -17.22 -15.86
THE CROW CITY ANGELS 18 14.53 -12.15 * -11.29
PITBALL 18 13.49 -12.50 * -12.06
FROGGER 2 18 10.48 -12.30 * -12.51
BIG OL’ BASS 2 18 14.45 -15.22 ** -16.29
MK & ASHLEY WINNER’S 18 11.88 -11.90 * -12.11
CIVILIZATION 2 18 9.73 -8.94 ** -11.36
PONG 18 11.43 -14.54 -13.10
ROGUE TRIP 14 1.80 -16.24 ** -30.14
RESIDENT EVIL 3:NEMES 18 10.16 -15.91 ** -17.48
ETERNAL EYES 18 8.31 -24.18 ** -25.35
TEKKEN 2 18 7.39 -15.13 ** -16.17
TEST DRIVE 4 18 11.50 -12.53 * -12.40
F1 WRLD GRAND PRIX 00 18 7.11 -29.76 -26.22
FADE TO BLACK 18 9.09 -21.99 ** -23.64
SHEEP RAIDER 18 9.35 -81.57 ** -121.60
G POLICE2:WPN JUSTICE 9 10.79 -8.60 * -8.56
RISK 10 9.50 -13.02 ** -33.94
SYNDICATE WARS 18 8.93 -16.71 -13.63
JUGGERNAUT 18 9.33 -51.62 ** -98.83
KISS PINBALL 10 8.47 -11.21 * -11.05
BACKYARD SOCCER 18 16.59 -24.94 -21.56
OLYMPIC SUMMER GAMES 18 8.57 -16.79 -14.71
NECTARIS:MILITARY MAD 18 13.34 -16.75 * -16.17
T.CLANCYS ROGUE SPEAR 18 5.38 -21.11 ** -22.90
TOCA 2 CAR CHALLENGE 18 13.75 -23.36 ** -26.08
NFL XTREME 2 18 14.35 -20.69 -17.40
ARENA FOOTBALL 17 3.40 -14.76 * -14.56
FINAL FANTASY IX 13 6.23 -10.78 -9.54
SHEEP 18 3.47 -22.08 ** -23.30
SIMPSON’S WRESTLING 12 8.66 -16.69 * -16.84
POCKET FIGHTER 18 10.51 -17.09 * -16.58
POWERBOAT RACING 18 10.50 -14.13 * -14.76
GRAND SLAM 97 18 11.09 -24.66 * -23.81
RAMPAGE WORLD TOUR 6 2.88 -1245.7 ** -2072.64
EAGLE ONE: HARRIER 13 11.43 -50.32 ** -77.20
STRIKER PRO 2000 9 10.66 -10.52 * -11.26
NEWMAN/HAAS RACING 16 3.88 -38.44 ** -54.93
DISCWRLD 2:MRTLY BYTE 18 6.31 -87.15 -38.19
CROSSROAD CRISIS 18 9.77 -93.93 -34.08
SLAM N JAM 96 18 10.23 -18.82 -15.18
NBA LIVE 2002 18 9.23 -80.22 ** -82.06
ARMD COR 2 PRJ PNTSMA 15 8.71 -11.77 ** -14.41
CRASH TEAM RACING 18 15.92 -342.07 ** -397.18
DISNEY’S DINOSAUR 18 5.00 -27.82 -18.46
NFL BLITZ 2000 18 5.63 -30.46 ** -34.48
Notes:** means that the Original Model LPD is greater than the Alternative LPD by more than
1 unit, * means that the difference between the original and alternative are less than 1 unit.
Alt. stand for Alternative and St.Dev for Standard Deviation.
Table 6: Comparison with Alternative Model
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A Estimation Methodology
To draw inference on the parameters we will rely on a Bayesian analysis and more specif-
ically the Gibbs sampler. Whenever possible we use Gibbs sampling with block updating
and when there are no closed form sampling distributions we rely on the Metropolis algo-
rithm. We run a Markov Chain for 200 thousand iterations of which the first 100 thousand
are discarded for burn-in and we keep each tenth remaining draws. This Markov Chain
has the posterior distribution of the parameters and the latent trigger variable indicators
Si i = 1, . . . , N as the stationary distribution. We programmed all our routines in Ox
(see Doornik (2007)) and our graphs in R (see R Development Core Team (2005)).
In all what follows we collect the first level model parameters in the blocks: τi =
(ρi,κi,αi, σi,λk,νk), ρ = (ρ1, ..., ρN ), κ = (κ1, ..., κN), α = (α1, ..., αN), σ
2 = (σ21, ..., σ
2
N ),
λk = (ln(λki), . ..,ln(λkN)) and finally νk = (ln(νik), ..., ln(νNk)).
We further collect all hyper-parameters in the following blocks: θ = (γP , γL,Π,Ω),
where Ω = (Ω1, ...,ΩK), Π = (pi1, ..., piK). We have that γ
P = (γκ, γρ) where γκ =
(γκ1 , ..., γ
κ
M) and γ
ρ = (γρ1 , ..., γ
ρ
M). Finally, γ
L = (γL1 , . . . , γ
L
K) where γ
L
k = (γ
λ
k , γ
ν
k) and
γλk = (γ
λ
k1, ..., γ
λ
kM) and γ
ν
k = (γ
ν
k1, ..., γ
ν
kM). M refers to the number of variables in Z,
K refers to the number of mixtures (same as number of triggers), and N refers to the
total number of products. Next Z=(Z1, ..., ZM) and φ(x;µ, σ
2) denotes the normal pdf
distribution with mean µ and variance σ2 evaluated at x. Finally, p() denotes a general
density function and IW (Ω̂, N) denotes the inverted Whishart distribution with scale
matrix Ω̂ and N degrees of freedom.
Note that in this context we treat the product specific parameters τi as latent variables.
We consider the log of λki and νki k = 1, ...K, i = 1, . . . , N as focal parameters strictly for
convenience and to impose that λki and νki are positive. This has no impact on the results.
In this Markov Chain we will sample the latent variables alongside the parameters.
The complete data likelihood for product i is
p(Pi, Si, τi|θ) = piSi × p(Pi|Si, τi, θ)× p(τi|θ), (12)
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where Pi = (Pi(0), ..., Pi(T )) and p(Pi|Si, τi, θ) is equal to
p(Pi(0)|Si, τi, θ)×
t=T∏
t=1
p(Pi(t)|Pi(t− 1), Si, τi, θ). (13)
Furthermore, we have that the first observation likelihood is
p(Pi(0)|Si, τi, θ) = φ
(
Pi(0);P
∗
i (0),
1
1− α2
σ2i
)
, (14)
and all other observations have as likelihood
p(Pi(t)|Pi(t− 1), Si, τi, θ) = φ
(
Pi(t);P
∗
i (t) + αi[Pi(t− 1)− P
∗
i (t− 1)], σ
2
i
)
. (15)
Next, we have
p(τi|θ) = p(ρi, κi|θ)
K∏
k=1
p(λki, νki|θ), (16)
where
p ((ρi, κi)|θ) = φ
(
(ρi, κi)
′; γP ′Zi,Σ
)
, (17)
and
p ((λki, νki)|θ) = φ
(
(λki, νki)
′; γL′k Zi,Ωk
)
. (18)
We impose flat priors on all almost all parameters, for αi we set a uniform prior on
the interval (-1,1) to impose stationarity. This completes the main model specification
and next we discuss how we sample from the posterior distribution for all parameters.
Sampling distributions
If pik is fixed across products, the density of Si conditional on Pi, τi, and θ equals a
Multinomial distribution with probabilities proportional to
piSi × p(Pi|Si, τi, θ). (19)
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The full conditional distribution for αi is a truncated normal on the interval [-1,1], where
the mean and variance are given by applying the Ordinary Least Squares formulas to
a regression of Pi(t)-P
∗
i (t) on its lag with known variance of the disturbance term σ
2
i .
A draw for σ2i can be obtained using the Metropolis-Hastings sampler and taking as
candidate
σ2icand =
T∑
t=1
(εˆi(t))
2
w
where w ∼ χ2(T−1), (20)
where εˆi(t) is the residual of equation (4) given all other parameters. We evaluate this
candidate and the current draw of σ2i in the conditional distribution of the first observation
given in equation (14). Hence we take the candidate as the next drawn value of σ2i with
probability
min
(
1,
φ
(
Pi(0);P
∗
i (0),
1
1−α2
σ2icand
)
φ
(
Pi(0);P
∗
i (0),
1
1−α2
σ2icurrent
)) . (21)
To derive the full conditional distribution of κi and ρi we first rewrite equations (4)
and (5) as
√
1− α2iPi(0) = [
√
1− α2ihSi(0)]× κi + [
√
1− α2ihSi(0)]× ρi + εi(0), (22)
and
Pi(t)−αiPi(t−1) = [1−hSi(t)−αi(1−hSi(t))]×κi+[hSi(t)−αihSi(t)]×ρi+εi(t). (23)
These equations should be combined with the specification of the hierarchical layer in (7)
as follows: 
Yi
γρ
′
Zi
γκ
′
Zi
 =

XAi X
B
i
1 0
0 1

 ρi
κi
+

εi
ωρ
ωκ
 , (24)
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where we define XAi and X
B
i as
XAi =

√
1− α2i (1− hSi(0))
1− hSi(1)− αi(1− hSi(1))
...
1− hSi(Ti)− αi(1− hSi(Ti))
 and
XBi =

√
1− α2ihSi(0)
hSi(1)− αihSi(1)
...
hSi(Ti)− αihSi(Ti)

,
(25)
and Yi as
Yi =

√
1− α2iPi(0)
Pi(1)− Pi(0)
...
Pi(T )− Pi(T − 1)

. (26)
Finally, we can draw κi and ρi from
N
(
(W ′iΓ
−1
i Wi)
−1W ′iΓ
−1
i Yi, (W
′
iΓ
−1Wi)
−1
)
, (27)
where
Wi =

XAi X
B
i
1 0
0 1
 and E

(
εi ω
ρ ωκ
)
εi
ωρ
ωκ

 =
 σ2i I 0
0 Σ
 = Γi.
(28)
Due to the non-linearity in the price patterns, the conditional distributions of λk and
νk are not of a known form. We will sample each parameter one at a time using a random
walk Metropolis Hastings sampler. Given the current draw of one of these parameters we
draw a candidate by adding a draw from a normal with mean zero and a fixed variance.
This candidate draw for λk and νk is accepted with probability
min
(
1,
p(λcandki |νki)
p(λcurrentki |νki)
)
and min
(
1,
p(νcandki |λki)
p(νcurrentki |λki)
)
, (29)
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respectively. The posterior of the i′th element of λk is
p(λki|νki) = p(Pi(0)|Si, τi, θ)
t=T∏
t=1
p(Pi(t)|Pi(t− 1)Si, τi, θ)φ
(
λki;λki|νki,Ω
λki|νki
k
)
, (30)
and the posterior of the i′th element of νk is
p(νki|λki) = p(Pi(0)|Si, τi, θ)
t=T∏
t=1
p(Pi(t)|Pi(t− 1)Si, τi, θ)φ
(
νki; νki|λki,Ω
νki|λki
k
)
. (31)
Here x|y refers to the conditional mean of x given y and σx|y refers to the conditional
variance of x given y. These are conditional posterior distributions because we allow
λk and νk to be correlated to each other. In other words, the timing of the price cut
and the speed of the price cut might be correlated and these correlation is different
across mixtures. The variance of the proposal density is chosen such that we obtain an
acceptance rate close to approximately 25%, that is the optimal rate for high-dimensional
models (see Robert and Casella (2004, page 316), Carlin and Louis (2000, page 154) or
Gamerman and Lopes (2006, page 196)).
The conditional distribution of pi1,. . . , piK is a Dirichlet distribution with parameters
1 +
∑
i 1[Si = 1],. . . , 1 +
∑
i 1[Si = K]; that is, we draw each pik proportional to the
number of products assigned to mixture k, that is
∑
1 1[Si = k], and naturally restrict∑
kpik=1.
Given the latent variables in τi sampling the hyper-parameters of the hierarchical
part for the marginal costs, launch price, and price landing characteristics is relatively
straightforward. We draw γP from a normal
γP ∼ N
 (Z′Z)−1Z ′κ
(Z ′Z)−1Z′ρ
,Σ⊗ (Z′Z)−1
 , (32)
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and γLk |Ωk from
N
 11+g (Z′Z)−1Z′λki
1
1+g
(Z′Z)−1Z′νki
,
1
1 + g
Ωk ⊗ (Z
′Z)−1
 . (33)
The factor g comes from the g-prior which states that the variance of (λki, νki) is
proportional to the variance of the data. See Fernandez et al. (2001) for a detailed
discussion.
Finally, we draw Σ ∼ IW
(
Σ̂, N
)
where
Σ̂ =
 ω̂κ
ω̂ρ
 (ω̂κ,ω̂ρ) (34)
and ω̂κi = κi − Z
′
iγ
κ, ω̂ρi = ρi − Z
′
iγ
ρ and ω̂κ = (ω̂κ1 . . . ω̂
κ
N) and ω̂
ρ = (ω̂ρ1 . . . ω̂
ρ
N). Next,
we draw Ωk ∼ IW
(
Ω̂k +G + I2, 7 +N
)
where
Ω̂k =
 η̂λk
η̂νk
 (η̂λk , η̂νk), (35)
and η̂λk = log(λk)− Z
′γλk and η̂
ν
k = log(νk)− Z
′γνk . finally Gk is defined as
Ĝk =
 γ̂λk
γ̂νk
 g(Z′Z)−1(γ̂λk , γ̂νk) (36)
and I2 is an identity matrix size 2× 2.
Hierarchical Structure in the Mixture Probabilities
The previous steps give the methodology to analyze our model without a hierarchical
specification on the mixture probabilities pik. As discussed in this article, the model can
be easily expanded to include a hierarchical specification on the mixture probabilities. As
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before, we will assume that piki differs across products but here we test if a multinomial
probit specification that depends on Z is useful to explain their heterogeneity. For that
we need to define first K latent variables for each product i
y∗ki ∼ N(Z
′
iδk, 1) (37)
where δ1 = 0 for identification. Product i belongs to mixture m if y
∗
mi is the largest of all
y∗ki k = 1, . . . , K. Given (37) , we can write the conditional distribution of y
∗
mi given the
other latent utilities (-m), denoted as y∗−m,i, as follows:
p(y∗mi|y
∗
−m,i, θ, τi, Si) = p(y
∗
mi > max(y
∗
−m,i))× p(Pi, Si = m, τi|θ)
+p(y∗mi < max(y
∗
−m,i))× p(Pi, Si = m
∗, τi|θ) (38)
where m∗ = argmax
m 6=k
(y∗ki). Based on (38) we can apply the inverse cdf technique to draw
y∗mi from its full conditional distribution. Note that in this specification the indicator
variable Ski is determined based on y
∗
mi and the δm parameters can be obtained from a
normal with mean (Z ′iZi)
−1Z ′iδk and variance (Z
′
iZi)
−1 for m = 2, . . . , K.
Posterior Predictive Density
We used two measures to compare predictive performance in Table 5: the root mean
squared error and the log of the posterior predictive density for observations after t = 7.
The predictive density log(p(Pi(7),...,Pi(T )|Pi(1),...,Pi(6))) is defined as:
log
∫ ∫ ∫
p(Pi(7),...,Pi(T )|Pi(1),...,Pi(6), Si, τi, θ)× p(Si, τi, θ|Pi(1),...,Pi(6))dSidτidθ
(39)
That is, we compute the log of the density for the forecast sample given the six observa-
tions included in the model and the posterior of all model parameters given these latter
observations. The posterior predictive density can easily be obtained from the MCMC
50
output by taking the log of the average out-of-sample likelihood over all draws.
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